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NOT EVERYONE IS SCREAMING FOR ICE
CREAM: HOW MARCHAND V. BARNHILL
IMPOSES A HEIGHTENED DUTY TO MONITOR
Jenifer Pickle*
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most challenging questions in corporate law is
determining the extent to which the board of directors must monitor
the corporation.1 To run a corporation properly, directors must uphold
their fiduciary duties to both the corporation and its shareholders.2
According to the Delaware Supreme Court, a board of directors must
demonstrate good faith efforts to implement and monitor a system of
oversight by having such a system in place, and to continually monitor
and update that system.3 Historically, plaintiffs have struggled to
succeed in bringing claims against a board of directors based on a
failure to monitor.4 However, the 2019 case of Marchand v. Barnhill5
has arguably created a new era, one in which plaintiffs can more easily
succeed in bringing a failure to monitor claim. In Marchand, a
shareholder of Blue Bell Creameries USA, Inc. brought a derivative
suit against the board of directors following a listeria
outbreak.6 Unlike previous duty to monitor cases, the court held that
* J.D. Candidate, May 2021, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Political Science, B.S.,
Sociology, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech), May 2018. I
sincerely thank Professor Therese Maynard for her wisdom, guidance, and feedback throughout
this process. I also extend my utmost gratitude to the staff and editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review, who have put so much hard work and effort into making this possible. Finally, I thank
my family for their unwavering support and encouragement, I could not do this without you.
1. Eric J. Pan, A Board’s Duty to Monitor, 54 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 717, 718 (2010) (stating
that in corporate law, it is difficult to determine whether the board of directors has a duty to prevent
harm to the corporation).
2. JOSEPH D. ZAMORE ET AL., 1 BUSINESS TORTS § 2.01 (rev. ed. 2020).
3. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
4. See Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 820 (Del. 2019); Stone, 911 A.2d at 372; In re
Caremark Int’l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996); Cydney Posner, Delaware Supreme Court
Allows Caremark Duty of Loyalty Claims Against Directors to Survive Dismissal Action, COOLEY
PUBCO (July 12, 2019), https://cooleypubco.com/2019/07/12/delaware-marchand-v-barnhill/.
5. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 805.
6. Id. at 805.
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the plaintiffs succeeded in alleging facts that support a reasonable
inference that the board failed their duty to monitor.7 The decision in
Marchand reinterprets the duty to monitor and creates a much stricter
standard for highly regulated industries, such as food and drug
companies.
This Comment examines the effects of Marchand and how
Delaware courts will approach duty to monitor claims in the future.
Part II considers the pre-Marchand framework of the board of
directors’ duty to monitor by examining the various standards
developed by Delaware courts in the past. Part III discusses the facts
of Marchand and examines the court’s holding and its reasoning. Part
IV argues that the court’s decision in Marchand has made it easier for
shareholder derivative suits to succeed in alleging claims based on the
board’s failure to monitor by examining the effects that Marchand has
had on recent litigation. Lastly, Part V analyzes the public policy
impact of Marchand for highly regulated industries and how to
navigate the duty to monitor following Marchand, especially during
the COVID-19 pandemic.
II. HISTORY OF THE DUTY TO MONITOR
Under corporate law, the board of directors is subject to the
fiduciary duties of (1) care and (2) loyalty.8 A board’s duty of care
requires directors to act in a manner that it reasonably believes to be
in the best interest of the corporation.9 A board may be held liable for
breaching its duty of care if it were to make an uninformed, unadvised
judgment that is not reasonably in the best interest of the corporation.10
In comparison, the duty of loyalty requires the board to (1) protect the
corporation’s interests and (2) refrain from causing harm to the
corporation.11 Directors breach their duty of loyalty when they “fail to
act in the face of a known duty to act, thereby demonstrating a
conscious disregard for their responsibilities.”12 However, in the
absence of a conflict of interest, the courts often apply a business
7. Id. at 824.
8. Peter A. Atkins et al., Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: Back to Delaware Law Basics, HARV.
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Mar. 10, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/03/10
/directors-fiduciary-duties-back-to-delaware-law-basics/; ZAMORE ET AL., supra note 2.
9. Atkins, supra note 8; ZAMORE ET AL., supra note 2.
10. ZAMORE ET AL., supra note 2.
11. See id.
12. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
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judgment rule, which presumes that the board of directors acted on an
informed basis in good faith and in the best interest of the company.13
Thus, courts have long refrained from holding directors liable for
harmful consequences that do not involve wrongful or illegal acts.14
Some scholars argue that by applying the business judgment rule,
courts have encouraged directors to be unaware of aggressive risktaking by officers.15 In breaching their fiduciary duties, the directors
could cause shareholders to suffer detrimental losses.16
While there is not a separate duty of good faith, some Delaware
courts impute such a duty in cases where numerous red flags have
arisen, finding a failure to monitor to be a breach of the fiduciary duty
of loyalty.17 To hold a director liable for failure to provide an adequate
system of oversight, the directors must have “utterly failed to
implement any reporting or information system or controls” or
“having implemented such a system or controls, consciously failed to
monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being
informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.”18 The most
important issue related to the duty to monitor is the standard of care
that must be taken by the board to detect potential harm.19 Imposing a
strict standard could cause a board to become risk-averse and cause
the company to overinvest in monitoring systems.20 Additionally, the
board could reject risky business decisions to prevent liability.21 For
this reason, past decisions from the Delaware courts have made it
difficult, if not impossible, for plaintiffs to succeed in duty to monitor
cases.22
13. ZAMORE ET AL., supra note 2.
14. Pan, supra note 1, at 718; see generally In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig.,
964 A.2d 106, 125 (Del. Ch. 2009) (explaining that the purpose of the business judgment rule is
“to allow corporate managers and directors to pursue risky transactions without the specter of being
held personally liable if those decisions turn out poorly”).
15. Pan, supra note 1, at 718.
16. Id.
17. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 370.
18. Id.
19. See Pan, supra note 1, at 720.
20. Ronald J. Daniels, Must Boards Go Overboard? An Economic Analysis of the Effects of
Burgeoning Statutory Liability on the Role of Directors in Corporate Governance, 24 CAN. BUS.
L.J. 229, 233 (1995) (discussing how directors may “be induced to operate the company in an
excessively risk averse fashion” to avoid liability); Pan, supra note 1, at 720.
21. See Daniels, supra note 20, at 234; Pan, supra note 1, at 720.
22. In re Caremark Int’l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) (describing the duty to
monitor claims as the “most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope
to win a judgment”); see also Pan, supra note 1, at 720 (discussing how Delaware courts have
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Over the past 60 years, Delaware courts have interpreted and
expanded upon the standard required to succeed in bringing a failure
to monitor claim.23 The three seminal Delaware cases establishing the
duty to monitor are Graham v. Allis-Chalmers,24 In re Caremark
International,25 and Stone v. Ritter.26 The landmark case was Graham,
which held that directors are not liable for failing to enact a
compliance program unless suspicious circumstances have been
brought to its attention that make the board aware of illegal or
wrongful activity.27 Thirty-three years later, the court expanded on
Graham through its decision in Caremark.28 The opinion of
Chancellor William Allen in Caremark remains the most
comprehensive examination of the meaning of duty to monitor,
leading these lawsuits to be referred to as “Caremark claims.”29 The
Caremark decision required directors to be informed and vigilant, so
that they may implement an information and reporting system even
before the occurrence of red flags.30 Only ten years later, in Stone v.
Ritter, the court expanded on the decision in Caremark.31 In Stone,
Justice Holland stated that to recover in an oversight case, the plaintiff
must show a lack of good faith on the part of the directors.32 A more
detailed examination of these three cases helps to understand the
modern standard applied today.
A. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers
In 1963, Graham was the first case in Delaware to acknowledge
a board’s duty to oversee compliance and preclude corporate
misconduct.33 In Graham, the plaintiffs filed a derivative suit on

limited the scope of the duty to monitor due to “the chilling effect that the threat of legal liability
may have on a board’s business judgment”).
23. See, e.g., Stone, 911 A.2d at 362; Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 126
(Del. 1963); In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d at 959.
24. 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
25. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
26. 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
27. Graham, 188 A.2d at 129.
28. In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d at 959.
29. See, e.g., Pan, supra note 1, at 722–23.
30. See In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d at 970.
31. Stone, 911 A.2d at 362.
32. Id. at 372.
33. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 129 (Del. 1963); see also Paul E.
McGreal, Caremark in the Arc of Compliance History, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 647, 651 (2018)
(discussing how the “fiduciary duty to oversee legal compliance” was first addressed in Graham);
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behalf of Allis-Chalmers against the company’s directors for failing to
stop employees from violating federal antitrust laws.34 Allis-Chalmers
was an electrical equipment manufacturer, whose company was
divided into multiple divisions and departments within those
divisions.35 The company’s business model was designed to
decentralize the delegation of authority by giving responsibilities to
the lowest management level capable of fulfilling the tasks.36 For this
reason, the department manager generally priced products, without the
participation of the directors.37 Instead, the board of directors would
meet once a month to consider general financial and operating data.38
During these meetings, the board would not consider specific issues
related to the various divisions or the departments within those
divisions.39
Multiple indictments charged Allis-Chalmers with violations of
anti-trust laws by engaging with other manufacturers and employees
to fix prices and interfere with bids to both private and governmental
agencies.40 While there was no evidence that the directors had actual
knowledge of the illegal anti-trust activity, the plaintiffs claimed that
prior decrees from the Federal Trade Commission in 1937 put the
directors on notice of their duty to ensure that future anti-trust activity
would not occur.41 However, none of the directors currently employed
by Allis-Chalmers were directors or officers in 1937.42 Thus, the court
held that the 1937 decrees did not put the directors on notice of the
possibility of future anti-trust activity.43
The plaintiffs further argued that the directors were liable for the
losses suffered by Allis-Chalmers based on their duty to actively
supervise and manage the corporate affairs, and that they should have
known of the employees’ illegal conduct.44 However, the court did not
agree with this argument either, and held directors are bound to use
Pan, supra note 1, at 21 (stating that Graham was the first case to recognize a board’s duty to
prevent corporate misconduct).
34. Graham, 188 A.2d at 127.
35. Id. at 128.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 129.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 129–30.
44. Id. at 130.
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the same care that an ordinarily prudent individual would use in
similar circumstances.45 The court held that “failure to exercise proper
control depends on the circumstances and facts of the particular
case.”46 Further, the court stated that “directors are entitled to rely on
the honesty and integrity of their subordinates until something occurs
to put them on suspicion that something is wrong.”47 If the directors
are suspicious of misconduct and fail to take action, they could be
liable; however, in this case, the directors could not possibly have
known all of the employees’ misconduct based on the company’s
decentralized system of decision making.48 Instead, the directors
decided company policy based on summaries, reports, and corporate
records.49 The court holds that this system was proper and is distinct
from cases in which directors recklessly rely on an obviously
untrustworthy employee, negligently perform their duties, or ignore
obvious signs of employee misconduct.50 In those situations, the court
held that the directors will be liable for the corporation’s losses based
on a neglect of duty, but none occurred here.51 According to the court
in Graham, this board acted promptly to end misconduct and prevent
its recurrence, once it became aware of the employees’ actions.52
Thus, the court held that the individual directors were not liable merely
because they were unaware of the fact that some employees of AllisChalmers violated anti-trust laws and caused the corporation losses.53
Following Graham, directors had no duty to install and operate
an oversight system absent cause for suspicion.54 In acknowledging
the duty to monitor, the court in Graham made two distinct points.
First, the court categorized the duty to monitor as falling within the
board’s duty of care.55 The duty of care arises from a board’s control
over the management of a corporation and in Graham, the court
specifically characterizes the board’s duty to monitor as “those of

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 131.
Id. at 130–31.
Id. at 130.
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control.”56 Second, the court defined the duty to monitor as a passive
duty, in which boards were only liable if they ignored obvious red
flags indicating wrongdoing.57 In reaching this conclusion, the court
gave boards very little incentive to monitor. Delaware courts
continued to follow the standard created in Graham for the next thirtythree years, until the court expanded upon the duty to monitor in
Caremark.
B. In re Caremark International
Chancellor William Allen’s opinion in In re Caremark
International provides one of the most expansive considerations of the
duty to monitor.58 Caremark International, Inc. (“Caremark”) was a
Delaware corporation, whose main revenue came from alternative site
health care and managed care services, including growth hormone
therapy, hemophilia therapy, and prescription drug programs.59 A
significant portion of Caremark’s revenue was obtained from thirdparty payments and insurance programs, including both Medicare and
Medicaid reimbursements.60 Some of these payments were regulated
by the Anti-Referral Payments Law (ARPL), which is enforced by the
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services and the Department of
Justice.61 The ARPL prohibits health care providers from making any
payments to encourage referrals of Medicare or Medicaid patients.62
Despite the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services’ attempt to
clarify the scope of the ARPL, there was much uncertainty about the
law due to a lack of court decisions interpreting the statute.63 Caremark
entered into contracts with various physicians and health care
providers in exchange for services, who in turn recommended
Caremark’s services or products to patients.64 However, to ensure that
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Pan, supra note 1, at 722–23 (referring to Chancellor William Allen’s opinion in
In re Caremark International as the “most complete exploration by a Delaware court of the meaning
of the duty to monitor”).
59. In re Caremark Int’l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 961 (Del. Ch. 1996).
60. Id.
61. Id.; see generally A Roadmap for New Physicians, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/physician-education/intro.asp (last visited Apr. 11, 2021)
(providing additional background on the Anti-Referral Payments Law and additional federal laws
regarding Medicare/Medicaid referrals).
62. In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d at 961–62.
63. Id. at 962.
64. Id.
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Caremark was not violating the ARPL, Caremark followed an internal
“Guide to Contractual Relationships” (the “Guide”), which was
initially created by Caremark’s predecessor in 1989, and was reviewed
and updated by Caremark’s lawyers annually.65 Each version of the
Guide established the policy that no payments would be made to
physicians and hospitals in exchange for the physicians inducing
patient referrals.66
Between 1991 and 1992, the Department of Health and Human
Services and the Department of Justice launched an investigation into
Caremark.67 This investigation attempted to uncover the extent to
which Caremark paid physicians for monitoring patients under their
care and making patient referrals.68 During this investigation,
Caremark claimed that it attempted to increase supervision over
branch operations and took additional steps to assure compliance with
the ARPL.69 As a result of this investigation, Caremark published
revised versions of its Guide and designed an internal audit plan to
enforce business and ethics policies.70
In August 1994, a Minnesota federal grand jury charged
Caremark, two of its officers, a sales employee, and a physician with
violating the ARPL.71 The indictment alleged Caremark had paid the
physician over $1.1 million to induce him to prescribe one of the
company’s human growth hormone drugs to his patients.72 In response
to this claim and the ongoing investigation, five separate stockholders
filed derivative suits on behalf of Caremark against the board of
directors.73 These actions, which the court consolidated, alleged “that
Caremark’s directors breached their duty of care by failing adequately
to supervise the conduct of Caremark employees, or institute
corrective measures, thereby exposing Caremark to fines and
liability.”74 Subsequently, in September of 1994, an Ohio federal
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.; see generally Milt Freudenheim, Caremark Is Indicted in Kickbacks, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 5, 1994), https://www.nytimes.com/1994/08/05/business/company-news-caremark-isindicted-in-kickbacks.html (discussing the investigation of Caremark).
68. In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d at 962; see generally Freudenheim, supra note 67
(discussing the investigation of Caremark).
69. In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d at 963.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 963–64.
72. Id. at 964.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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grand jury issued an additional indictment, claiming that an Ohio
physician had received $134,600 in exchange for referrals of patients,
in violation of the ARPL.75 One month later, the shareholder
derivative suit amended the complaint to include the Ohio
indictment.76
In January 1995, Caremark terminated any remaining financial
relationships with physicians related to Caremark’s business of home
infusion, hemophilia, and growth hormones.77 A few months later,
Caremark began settlement negotiations with the federal and state
agencies that had been investigating Caremark’s wrongdoing.78 As a
result of these negotiations, Caremark offered to make payments of
approximately $250 million to both private and public parties.79
In 1996, the Court of Chancery of Delaware considered whether
to approve a proposed settlement of a consolidated derivative action
on behalf of Caremark.80 However, in approving the settlement,
Chancellor William Allen took the opportunity to examine the duty to
monitor.81 The shareholders claimed that Caremark’s directors
“allowed a situation to develop and continue which exposed the
corporation to enormous legal liability and that in so doing they
violated a duty to be active monitors of corporate performance.”82 The
court in Caremark expressed that this is the most difficult claim for a
plaintiff to succeed upon.83
A director’s liability for failure to monitor may arise from (1) a
board decision that was “ill-advised or ‘negligent’” or (2) “an
unconsidered failure of the board to act in circumstances in which due
attention would, arguably, have prevented the loss.”84 When
considering director liability, courts will apply the business judgment
rule.85 The business judgment rule holds that a director has not
breached the duty to monitor if the board exercised a good faith effort

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 965.
Id.
Id. at 960–61.
Id. at 966.
Id. at 967.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 967–68.
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to be informed and to exercise appropriate judgment.86 According to
the Caremark court, plaintiffs would have to show (1) the directors
knew or should have known that violations of law were occurring; (2)
the directors failed to make any good faith efforts to prevent or remedy
the situation; and (3) such failure proximately resulted in financial
losses to the corporation.87 According to the court, a director could be
held liable for losses caused by non-compliance with applicable legal
standards if they fail to assure that adequate corporate information and
reporting systems exist.88
In Caremark, Chancellor Allen recognized the benefits
shareholders could receive from a heightened duty to monitor and took
care to ensure that the scope of his opinion was not too broad.89 The
court made certain that the test of liability for directors—a lack of
good faith—was quite high.90 Directors would not be required to
possess detailed information about every aspect of the corporation, as
“such a requirement would simple [sic] be inconsistent with the scale
and scope of efficient organization size in this technological age.”91 If
directors were not aware of the specific activities that led to the
corporation’s losses, they could not be liable.92
Through the court’s opinion, Chancellor William Allen created a
stricter monitoring standard than was applied in Graham, by extending
the board’s liability to situations where they “should have known that
violations of law were occurring.”93 This standard is broader than that
of Graham, where directors were only liable for neglecting obvious
red flags. In cases prior to Caremark, Delaware courts viewed the
board as being uninvolved in the day-to-day operations of the
corporation.94 However, in Caremark, Chancellor Allen recognized
that “ordinary business decisions that are made by officers and
employees deeper in the interior of the organization can, however,
vitally affect the welfare of the corporation and its ability to achieve
its various strategic and financial goals.”95 Thus, after Caremark,
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 968.
Id. at 971.
Id. at 970.
Id. at 971.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Pan, supra note 1, at 726.
In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d at 968.
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Delaware courts created a stricter obligation on boards, by requiring
directors “to act in good faith to assure the board was receiving
sufficient information to oversee operations.”96 Despite this, it was
still difficult for plaintiffs to succeed upon a Caremark claim, as the
plaintiff still had to prove that the board failed to provide reasonable
oversight in a continuous and systematic manner.97 While the standard
in Caremark gave much more insight than the previous case of
Graham, there was still a lack of clarity around the board’s duty to
monitor, leading to the court’s analysis in Stone v. Ritter ten years
later.
C. Stone v. Ritter
In 2006, the Delaware Supreme Court was presented with the
opportunity to reexamine Caremark’s duty to monitor standard.98 In
Stone, the plaintiffs brought a derivative complaint against the
directors of AmSouth Bancorporation (“AmSouth”).99 AmSouth was
a Delaware corporation, whose wholly-owned subsidiary, AmSouth
Bank, operated commercial banking branches throughout the
southeastern United States.100 “In 2004, AmSouth and AmSouth Bank
paid $40 million in fines and $10 million in civil penalties” in response
to government and regulatory investigations, which concluded bank
employees failed to file Suspicious Activity Reports (“SARs”)
required by federal anti-money-laundering regulations.101 In October,
the Federal Reserve and Alabama Banking Department required
AmSouth to improve its Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and Anti-Money
Laundering (AML) compliance program and to hire an independent
consultant “to conduct a comprehensive review of the Bank’s AML
compliance program and make recommendations, as appropriate, for
new policies and procedures to be implemented by the Bank.”102
Additionally, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”)

96. Michael Furey, Del. Caremark Opinion Shows Shift in Deference to Boards, LAW360
(July 23, 2020, 5:03 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1292332/del-caremark-opinionshows-shift-in-deference-to-boards.
97. Pan, supra note 1, at 723.
98. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 364 (Del. 2006).
99. Id. at 365.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 366.
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found that AmSouth’s compliance program “lacked adequate board
and management oversight.”103
The plaintiff shareholders filed a derivative suit, alleging a classic
Caremark claim.104 Plaintiffs specifically claimed that the directors
“utterly failed to implement any sort of statutorily required
monitoring, reporting or information controls that would have enabled
them to learn of problems requiring their attention.”105 Here, the court
discussed how the failure to act in good faith may lead to liability, as
it is a fundamental condition of the duty of loyalty.106 The court
applied the Caremark standard, and held that the necessary conditions
for director oversight liability are that the board: (1) “utterly failed to
implement any reporting or information system or controls” or (2)
“having implemented such a system or controls, consciously failed to
monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being
informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.”107 According
to a report from an independent consultant, AmSouth’s board had
dedicated numerous resources to the BSA/AML compliance program
and put multiple systems into place to ensure compliance with these
regulations.108 These systems established a reporting procedure and
allowed directors to periodically monitor AmSouth’s compliance with
the necessary regulations.109 Therefore, the court held that the
plaintiffs failed to establish facts to satisfy the high burden of the
Caremark standard.110
In Stone, the court redefined the duty to monitor as a failure of
good faith, which they determined was a subsidiary element of the
duty of loyalty.111 This was inherently different than the court’s
opinion in Graham and Caremark, where both courts considered the
duty to monitor to be part of the duty of care.112 The standard from
Stone created three challenges for plaintiffs: (1) plaintiffs must show
103. Id.
104. Id. at 364.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 369–70.
107. Id. at 370.
108. Id. at 371.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 373.
111. Id. at 370; Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty
of Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1769, 1769–70 (2007); Pan, supra note 1, at 727.
112. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963); In re Caremark Int’l,
698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996); Hill & McDonnell, supra note 111.
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scienter by proving that the board acted with “conscious disregard for
their responsibilities,” (2) the board is responsible only for preventing
wrong or illegal acts, and (3) the board cannot be held liable for failing
to keep up with the outcomes of previous board decisions.113 However,
the most significant change was that post-Stone, oversight liability
required an element of scienter, requiring plaintiffs to prove that
directors not only breached their duty to monitor but did so
knowingly.114
III. MARCHAND V. BARNHILL
These three Delaware court decisions have resulted in making it
close to impossible for plaintiffs to succeed in finding boards liable
for failure to monitor. However, in 2019, plaintiffs were given a ray
of hope with the court’s decision in Marchand v. Barnhill.115 The issue
in Marchand surrounded Blue Bell Creameries USA, Inc. (“Blue
Bell”), a Delaware corporation and one of the largest manufacturers
of ice cream in the nation.116 Blue Bell operates in a heavily regulated
food industry, which is primarily governed by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA).117 Blue Bell must comply with all regulations
and establish controls to monitor for and avoid contamination.118 The
FDA has strict guidelines, which require food manufacturers like Blue
Bell to conduct operations with adequate sanitation principles and
institute a written food safety plan, which includes a food hazard
analysis and implements preventative controls.119 In addition to
federal regulations, Blue Bell must also adhere to various state
regulations in each of the three states that it operates in—Texas,
Oklahoma, and Alabama.120
Between 2009 and 2013, Blue Bell repeatedly failed to comply
with the required regulations.121 FDA inspections in Texas discovered
leaking pipes, ripped and open containers of ingredients, and
113. Stone, 911 A.2d at 369, 370; Pan, supra note 1, at 719–20; Louis J. Bevilacqua, Monitoring
the Duty to Monitor, N.Y. L.J. (Nov. 28, 2011).
114. See Bevilacqua, supra note 113 (stating that by adding an element of scienter, “Stone made
it virtually impossible for plaintiffs to show that directors breached their duty”).
115. 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019).
116. Id. at 807, 809.
117. Id. at 810.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 810–11.
121. Id. at 811–12.
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employees failing to wear gloves or wash their hands, in violation of
FDA standards.122 Additionally, in 2010 and 2011 the Alabama
Department of Health found equipment left on the floor, standing
water, open lids, and unprotected measuring cups, in violation of
Alabama regulations and FDA standards.123 And, an inspection of the
facility in Oklahoma further revealed a failure to manufacture foods
under sanitary conditions and a failure to handle equipment in a way
that protects against contamination, in violation of FDA standards.124
In addition to the FDA’s inspections, Blue Bell also conducted internal
investigations of their Oklahoma facility.125 According to the
complaint, these internal examinations found “presumptively positive
tests [of listeria] dating back to 2013.”126 Later, in 2014, a third-party
laboratory found two positive reports of listeria in the Oklahoma
facility.127
Despite management’s knowledge of the listeria findings, the
complaint alleges that the “information never made its way to the
board, and the board continued to be uninformed about (and thus
unaware of) the problem.”128 The board’s meetings in early 2014
showed no discussion of the listeria reports or the findings of the FDA
inspections, which is further evidence that the board did not know of
the listeria reports.129 Throughout the remainder of 2014, the
Oklahoma facility continued positive findings of listeria.130 Ironically,
board minutes from the September 2014 meeting stated that recent
third-party audits for sanitation issues “went well.”131
The next year showed no improvements for Blue Bell.132 Positive
coliform levels were found in the Oklahoma facility during January
2015, and one month later, Blue Bell received notification of positive
122. Id. at 811.
123. Id.
124. Id.; see generally BLUE BELL CREAMERIES, LP, ESTABLISHMENT INSPECTION REPORT 2
(Mar. 28, 2012), https://www.fda.gov/files/about%20fda/published/Blue-Bell-Creameries--LP-Broken-Arrow--OK--EIR-dated-3-28-12.pdf (discussing the FDA’s findings at the Oklahoma
facility).
125. Marchand v. Barnhill, No. 2017-0586-JRS, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 316, at *12–13 (Del.
Ch. Sept. 27, 2018), rev’d, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019).
126. Id. at *13.
127. Id.
128. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 812.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 812–13.
132. Id. at 813.
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listeria tests at the Texas plant from the Texas Department of State
Health Services.133 Interestingly, the Blue Bell board of directors did
not discuss any issues of listeria during their meeting on February 19,
2015.134 However, four days later Blue Bell initiated a limited recall,
likely in response to the findings by the Texas Department of State
Health Services.135 Two days later, on February 25, 2019, the board
met and discussed how the FDA was working with the Texas health
inspectors to investigate the recall.136 This was the first time that the
board’s discussion of listeria was reported in the minutes, despite the
overwhelming evidence that the contamination was occurring.137 By
March 13, 2015, the FDA, CDC, and Bluebell had all issued public
recall notifications.138 However, listeria cases continued to rise and
resulted in the deaths of three adults from Kansas.139 These
overwhelming implications forced Blue Bell’s chief executive officer,
advertising and public relations manager, and vice president for sales
and marketing to meet in April 2015.140 During this meeting, the
executives decided to expand the recall to all of Blue Bell’s products
and shut down all of its production operations.141 In total, the listeria
outbreak caused by Blue Bell’s products infected ten people across
four states: Arizona, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas.142
Following the full product recall, the FDA reinspected all three of
the company’s plants.143 The investigation did not fare well for Blue
Bell.144 At the Texas facility, the FDA found a “‘failure to manufacture
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 813–14.
137. Id.
138. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Office of Pub. Affs., Blue Bell Creameries Agrees to Plead Guilty and
Pay $19.35 Million for Ice Cream Listeria Contamination—Former Company President Charged
(May 1, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/blue-bell-creameries-agrees-plead-guilty-and-pay1935-million-ice-cream-listeria.
139. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 814; Multistate Outbreak of Listeriosis Linked to Blue Bell
Creameries Products (Final Update), CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL (June 10, 2015, 10:30 AM),
https://www.cdc.gov/listeria/outbreaks/ice-cream-03-15/index.html.
140. Rachel Abrams & Hiroko Tabuchi, For Blue Bell, a Drastic Move to Recall Ice Cream as
Listeria Findings Rose, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/22/busin
ess/listeria-leads-to-major-ice-cream-recall.html.
141. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 814; Marchand v. Barnhill, No. 2017-0586-JRS, 2018 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 316, at *16 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 2018), rev’d, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019).
142. Multistate Outbreak of Listeriosis Linked to Blue Bell Creameries Products, supra note
139.
143. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 814.
144. Id.
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foods under conditions and controls necessary to minimize the
potential for growth of microorganisms,’ inadequate cleaning and
sanitizing procedures, ‘failure to maintain buildings in repair
sufficient to prevent food from coming adulterated,’ and improper
construction of the building that failed to prevent condensation from
occurring.”145 In Oklahoma, the FDA found that listeria tests had been
showing positive results for the past three years, and there was a failure
to manufacture and package foods in a way to minimize the potential
for contamination.146 While the conditions of the Alabama plant were
not as severe as Texas and Oklahoma, the FDA continued to find
contamination and failure to perform necessary testing to identify
possible food contamination.147
Following the company’s recall and listeria outbreak, a Blue Bell
shareholder requested the company’s books and records.148 The
shareholder then filed a derivative suit, claiming that the board failed
to inform itself of Blue Bell’s food safety compliance and failed to
respond appropriately to the growing food safety issues.149 The
complaint alleged multiple facts that are relevant to this issue: (1) there
was no board committee in place that addressed food safety; (2) Blue
Bell had no regular process or protocols that required management to
notify the board or keep them apprised of food safety compliance
practices, risks, or reports; (3) the board did not have a schedule to
consider any key food safety risks existed; (4) board minutes show
that management did not disclose any cautionary or red flags to the
board leading up to the unfortunate deaths of three customers; (5)
management reported favorable information about food safety to the
board, but the board was not shown any unfavorable reports or FDA
findings; and (6) the minutes from board meetings were lacking any
suggestion that there was regular discussion of food safety issues.150
The complaint also alleged that the issues the FDA found could have
been cured if management had relayed the information to the board on
an ongoing basis.151 Initially, the Delaware Court of Chancery granted
Blue Bell’s motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiff failed to plead
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 815.
Id. at 815–16.
Id. at 816.
Id. at 822.
Id.
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any facts to support “his contention that the [Blue Bell] Board ‘utterly’
failed to adopt or implement any reporting and compliance
systems.”152 The Court of Chancery reasoned that the plaintiff did not
challenge the existence of a monitoring system, “but the effectiveness
of monitoring and reporting controls in particular instances,” which is
“not a valid theory under . . . Caremark.”153 The shareholder plaintiffs
appealed, and in June 2019, the Supreme Court of Delaware issued its
opinion and reversed the Court of Chancery’s decision.154
The Supreme Court of Delaware applied the rule from Caremark,
which requires a director to make a good faith effort to implement an
oversight system and monitor it.155 The court recognized that directors
have the discretion to approach business and industry-specific
approaches, but the directors must still meet the bottom-line
requirement to make a good faith effort to implement a reasonable
system of monitoring and reporting.156 Prior case law has given great
deference to a company’s board of directors and made the Caremark
claim standard difficult—if not impossible—to meet.157 If the facts
can show that the directors have “a relevant committee, a regular
protocol requiring board-level reports about the relevant risks, or the
board’s use of third-party monitors, auditors, or consultants,” it is
unlikely that the court will hold in favor of the plaintiff.158
However, the court held that the plaintiff in Marchand did meet
the difficult Caremark standard.159 If a “plaintiff can plead an
inference that a board has undertaken no efforts to make sure it is
informed of a compliance issue intrinsically critical to the company’s
business operation, then that supports an inference that the board has
not made the good faith effort that Caremark requires.”160 In defense,
the directors of Blue Bell emphasized the fact that manuals were in
place discussing safety practices and third-party audits were

152. Id. at 808 (quoting Marchand v. Barnhill, No. 2017-0586-JRS, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 316,
at *41 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 2018), rev’d, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019)).
153. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 821 (omission in original) (quoting Marchand, 2018 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 316, at *41).
154. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 808.
155. Id. at 820–21.
156. Id. at 821.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 823.
159. Id. at 824.
160. Id. at 822.
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commissioned occasionally.161 However, the court stressed that
simple compliance with FDA regulation and the fact that management
received results of government inspections is not enough to meet the
requirements to implement “a system to monitor food safety at the
board level.”162 Blue Bell directors also emphasized that management
communicated with them regularly regarding “operational issues.”163
Again, the court did not agree with this argument.164 Food safety is
essential to Blue Bell’s operation, and the facts that the plaintiff pled
support a fair inference that there was no system of food safety
monitoring or reporting at the board-level.165 Additionally, the court
noted that “as a monoline company that makes a single product—ice
cream—Blue Bell can only thrive if its consumers enjoyed its products
and were confident that its products were safe to eat.”166 Here, the
board’s lack of efforts not only resulted in a lack of “compliance,” but
also resulted in the deaths and illness of Blue Bell’s customers.167 For
this reason, the Supreme Court of Delaware reversed the Court of
Chancery’s decision to grant the defendant’s motion to dismiss.168 The
Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs succeeded in alleging
“particularized facts that support a reasonable inference that the Blue
Bell board failed to implement any system to monitor Blue Bell’s food
safety performance or compliance.”169 Thus, the Supreme Court
remanded the case for proceedings consistent with their opinion.170
IV. THE CURRENT DUTY TO MONITOR STANDARD
A. The Marchand Standard
Generally, it is quite difficult for a plaintiff to plead a Caremark
claim and ultimately prove liability based on a board’s failure to
monitor.171 According to Chief Justice Strine, writing in Marchand, a
Caremark claim is “possibly the most difficult theory in corporation
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
note 4.

Id. at 822–23.
Id. at 823.
Id.
Id. at 823–24.
Id. at 824.
Id. at 809.
Id. at 814.
Id. at 808.
Id. at 809.
Id. at 824.
See, e.g., id.; In re Caremark Int’l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996); Posner, supra
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law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.”172
Marchand arguably lowers the heightened standard that plaintiffs
previously had to plead under Caremark and Stone. In doing this,
Marchand gives new life to duty to monitor claims.
Prior to Marchand, Caremark claims were typically dismissed in
early pleading stages, even before discovery.173 It was difficult for
plaintiffs to reach the high standard required by Caremark and Stone,
as they would have to prove that that the board utterly failed “to
attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system
exists.”174 Marchand expands on the court’s previous interpretations
and explains that compliance with regulations is not enough. In the
Marchand opinion, Justice Strine clarifies that Blue Bell’s compliance
with applicable regulations “does not foreclose any pleading-stage
inference that the directors’ lack of attentiveness rose to the level of
bad faith indifference required to state a Caremark claim.”175 The
court’s decision in Marchand warns directors to be proactive when
creating a proper compliance program and conducting risk
oversight.176 For companies in the food industry, like Blue Bell,
nominal compliance with FDA regulations is simply not enough.177
Instead, after Marchand, companies may be more likely to face
liability if they fail to “make a good faith effort to implement an
oversight system and then monitor it.”178
B. Post-Marchand Litigation
Following Marchand, the Delaware courts released two
subsequent decisions allowing both Caremark claims to survive
motions to dismiss.179 By analyzing the Caremark claims that were
brought post-Marchand, we can better understand what the current
duty to monitor standard is. In Section IV.B.1, I will discuss the case
172. In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d at 967.
173. Holly J. Gregory et al., Board Oversight in Light of COVID-19 and Recent Delaware
Decisions, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 26, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harva
rd.edu/2020/05/26/board-oversight-in-light-of-covid-19-and-recent-delaware-decisions/.
174. Id.
175. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 823.
176. Posner, supra note 4.
177. See id.
178. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 821.
179. See In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., No. 2017-0222-JRS, 2019 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 1293, at *38 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019); Hughes v. Hu, No. 2019-0112-JTL, 2020 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 162, at *54 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2020).
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of In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litigation,180 and its
similarity to Marchand. In Section IV.B.2, I will discuss Hughes v.
Hu,181 and contrast how the duty to monitor standard may be applied
differently depending on what industry the company is involved in and
what regulations it must comply with.
1. In re Clovis Oncology, Inc.
Just a few months after Marchand, the Delaware Court of
Chancery found a Caremark claim sufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss in In re Clovis Oncology, Inc.182 Clovis Oncology, Inc.
(“Clovis”) is a biopharmaceutical company, who was in the process of
developing a lung cancer drug, Rociletinib (“Roci”).183 During this
time, Clovis had no pharmaceutical products on the market, and Roci
was the most promising among the drugs in development.184 As part
of the development process for Roci, Clovis conducted a clinical trial
to test the safety and efficacy of the drug.185 The clinical trial was
supposed to be based on the protocol that Clovis had submitted to the
FDA.186 However, Clovis did not adhere to the protocol and included
unconfirmed responses from trial participants, even though the FDA
could only approve Roci based on confirmed responses.187 By
incorporating unconfirmed responses, the biopharmaceutical
company miscalculated drug performance metrics and even failed to
account for the drug’s side effects.188 In doing such, Clovis reported
inflated success rates to the public.189 Eventually, Clovis disclosed to
the public that Roci was much less successful than was previously
reported, which caused Clovis’ stock to drop 70%.190 Further, Clovis
was forced to stop the clinical development of the drug in May 2016,

180. 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1293.
181. 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 162.
182. In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1293, at *4.
183. Id. at *2; see generally Adam Slutsky et al., Caremark Round II: Beware Red Flags in
Drug Development, GOODWIN (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.goodwinlaw.com/publications/2019/1
0/10_08-caremark-round-ii-beware-red-flags (discussing additional background regarding the
drug, “Roci”).
184. In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1293, at *5.
185. Id. at *9.
186. Id. at *9–10.
187. Id. at *12.
188. Id. at *18–19.
189. Id. at *12.
190. Id. at *17.
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following the FDA’s refusal to approve it.191 Clovis’ failure to adhere
to proper clinical trial protocol resulted in investigations by the FDA
and the SEC, and a shareholder derivative lawsuit.192
In this derivative suit, the plaintiffs claimed that the board of
directors for Clovis ignored red flags indicating the company was not
adhering to FDA protocols in clinical trials for its new drug.193 While
the Marchand court found the board liable on the first prong of
Caremark,194 the court in Clovis held that the first prong of Caremark
was satisfied based on the fact that the Clovis board had tasked its
nominating and corporate governance committee with providing
oversight of federal health care and FDA requirements.195 Instead, the
court found that the board was liable under the second prong of
Caremark because they consciously failed to monitor the system of
controls that they implemented.196
The court characterized Clovis as a company operating in a highly
regulated industry, where compliance with protocols is critical.197 The
Clovis board failed to address the unconfirmed reports, even though
they had enough experience in the pharmaceutical industry to
understand the risks of violating FDA protocols and procedures.198
Thus, the monetary and reputational harm to Clovis stems from the
company’s “mission critical failure” to comply with the protocol and
related FDA regulations.199 The court noted that Caremark liability is
more likely to attach when the alleged oversight failure concerns
191. Id.
192. Id. at *21.
193. Id. at *22; see generally Stephanie C. Evans & Alan J. Wilson, Another Reminder from
Delaware About the Duty of Oversight, WILMERHALE (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.wilmerhale.c
om/sitecore/content/Shared-Data/Blogs/Focus-on-Audit-Committees-Accounting-and-theLaw/2019/10/28/20191028-Another-Reminder-from-Delaware-About-the-Duty-of-Oversight
(providing additional background on the facts of Clovis).
194. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 824 (Del. 2019). Following Caremark, courts have
held that a plaintiff can show director liability on one of two prongs: (1) the directors failed to
implement an adequate monitoring system or (2) having implemented a system, the board failed to
properly monitor it. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006); see Evans & Wilson, supra
note 193 (discussing how the plaintiffs in Marchand successfully pleaded facts that show Blue Bell
failed to implement any monitoring system).
195. In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1293, at *29.
196. Id. at *32.
197. Id. at *30–31.
198. See id. at *6–8; see also Gardner Davis & John Wolfel, Delaware Court Permits Caremark
Claim Against Clovis Oncology Board, 34 WESTLAW J. DEL. CORP. (2019) (discussing how the
board was “comprised of experienced biopharmaceutical executives, medical researchers[,] and
health care-focused venture capitalists”).
199. In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1293, at *32.
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“compliance with positive law,”200 as opposed to the managing of
business risk.201 For these reasons, the court allowed the plaintiff’s
Caremark claim to survive a motion to dismiss.202
The most significant shift between the standard applied in
Caremark and Stone and the standard applied in Marchand and Clovis
is the judicial emphasis placed on board monitoring of businesses
operating in highly regulated industries. While Caremark and Stone
were focused on business decisions that harmed the company, the
failure to adequately monitor food and drug industries could create
significant harm to the general public.
Although Blue Bell Creameries operated in the food industry and
Clovis operated in the pharmaceutical industry, the companies’
business models were very similar. Both Blue Bell and Clovis
operated with a monoline business model.203 “As ice cream was to
Blue Bell Creameries, Clovis’ Rociletinib (‘Roci’) drug candidate to
treat lung cancer was Clovis’ mission critical product.”204 Although
Roci was not the only drug that Clovis was developing, it was the only
one that was “especially promising.”205 Additionally, both companies
in Marchand and Clovis were regulated by the Food and Drug
Administration, whose mission is to protect public health “by ensuring
the safety, efficacy, and security of human and veterinary drugs,
biological products, and medical devices; and by ensuring the safety
of our nation’s food supply, cosmetics, and products that emit
radiation.”206 Although the line between food and pharmaceutical
industries is sometimes blurred, there is one important factor that they

200. Id. at *27. When using the phrase “positive law,” the Chancery Court of Delaware explains
that this includes regulatory mandates. Id. The Court is likely using the phrase “positive law” to
describe statutes and laws from regulatory authorities, such as the FDA and SEC. See id.
201. Id. at *27 (stating that “it is appropriate to distinguish the board’s oversight of the
company’s management of business risk that is inherent in its business plan from the board’s
oversight of the company’s compliance with positive law”) (emphasis omitted); see also Davis &
Wolfel, supra note 198 (discussing how the court in Clovis suggested that Delaware courts are
more likely to find Caremark oversight liability if the company is regulated by positive laws).
202. In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1293, at *32.
203. See id. at *3; Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 809 (Del. 2019); see also Evans &
Wilson, supra note 193 (comparing Blue Bell’s monoline business model to the model used by
Clovis).
204. Evans & Wilson, supra note 193; In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., 2019 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 1293, at *31.
205. In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1293, at *2.
206. What We Do, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/what-we-do (last updated Mar. 28,
2018).

(10) 54.4_PICKLE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

11/18/21 12:40 PM

MARCHAND’S HEIGHTENED DUTY TO MONITOR

1287

have in common—a need for public safety.207 Here, Clovis chose to
disregard one of Roci’s significant side effects, QT prolongation,
which carries a risk of sudden cardiac death.208 Thus, if Clovis had
succeeded in distributing Roci, multiple consumers could have been
put at risk for severe illness or even death.
When considering the oversight of food and drug companies,
boards must be more risk-averse, as the public’s health and safety are
at risk. The Clovis court cites Marchand repeatedly, and states that
“when a company operates in an environment where externally
imposed regulations govern its ‘mission critical’ operations, the
board’s oversight function must be more rigorously exercised.”209 The
court’s opinion in Clovis, “signals that, post-Marchand, the Delaware
courts, in assessing Caremark claims at the pleading stage, may hold
boards operating in highly regulated industries to a somewhat elevated
standard for monitoring and assessing compliance with missioncritical regulatory regimes.”210 For these reasons, Marchand and
Clovis demonstrate a significant emphasis on the importance of the
duty to monitor to protect public health and safety.
2. Hughes v. Hu
As of April 2020, another Caremark claim survived a motion to
dismiss in the case of Hughes v. Hu.211 Hughes involves a Caremark
claim against the audit committee and several executives of Kandi
Technologies Group, Inc. (“Kandi”).212 Kandi is a publicly-traded
207. Sometimes it can be difficult to differentiate between foods and drugs; for example,
caffeine can be considered as both a food when found in caffeine drinks, or a drug when ingested
in pill form. However, both food and drugs can cause significant harm, such as obesity, overdose,
or even death. Matthew J. Edlund, Is That a Food or a Drug?: What’s Really Inside that Food You
Just Ate?, PSYCH. TODAY (May 5, 2011), https://www.psychologytoday.com/intl/blog/the-powerrest/201105/is-food-or-drug.
208. In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1293, at *18–20; see
Wesley T. O’Neal, et al., Association Between QT-Interval Components and Sudden Cardiac
Death, CIRCULATION: ARRHYTHMIA & ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY (2017), https://www.ahajournals.o
rg/doi/10.1161/CIRCEP.117.005485.
209. In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1293, at *28 (quoting
Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 824 (Del. 2019) (stating “food safety was essential and
mission critical”)).
210. John Mark Zeberkiewicz & Robert B. Greco, In re Clovis: Considering Caremark Claims
After Marchand, 33 INSIGHTS: CORP. & SEC. L. ADVISOR, Nov. 2019, at 36, 38.
211. See Hughes v. Hu, No. 2019-0112-JTL, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 162, at *4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27,
2020); Cydney Posner, Another Caremark Claim Survives Dismissal, COOLEY PUBCO (May 12,
2020), https://cooleypubco.com/2020/05/12/caremark-claim-survives-dismissal/.
212. Hughes, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 162, at *1.
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Delaware company based in China that sells parts for the
manufacturing of electric vehicles.213 Kandi had faced financial
reporting issues in the past, dating back to 2010.214 In particular, the
company had numerous issues with properly reporting related-party
transactions.215 Although these material weaknesses were publicly
announced in 2014, no remedial actions were taken.216
In March 2017, Kandi disclosed in its 10-K that three years of
financial statements were to be restated and that it lacked sufficient
expertise related to GAAP, SEC disclosure requirements, and
effective financial controls.217 Following this, plaintiff shareholders
commenced litigation on Kandi’s behalf, alleging the directors who
comprised the audit committee failed to establish a board-level system
of oversight, which led to the March 2017 restatement that caused the
Company severe harm.218 The complaint identified numerous issues
including (1) internal audits were reported directly to the CEO, not to
the audit committee; (2) the audit committee met only once a year for
no more than an hour; (3) Kandi’s outside auditor was sanctioned by
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board for improperly
handling 2010, 2011, and 2012 audits; and (4) a lack of policies or
procedures mentioned in the company’s minutes.219 While the
company did have an audit committee and internal audit department,
the Hughes court compared these directors to those in Marchand, who
failed to make good faith efforts to reasonably monitor at the boardlevel.220 The court even went as far as to say that the board’s “pattern
of behavior indicates that they followed management blindly, even
after management had demonstrated an inability to report accurately
about related-party transactions.”221 Thus, although Kandi had an
audit committee, the Court of Chancery found that these directors

213. Id. at *5–6; Posner, supra note 211.
214. Hughes, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 162, at *1; Posner, supra note 211.
215. Hughes, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 162, at *1.
216. Id. at *1–2.
217. Id. at *2 (stating that the Company “lacked[] sufficient expertise relating to technical
knowledge of US GAAP requirements and SEC disclosure regulations; [s]ufficient expertise to
ensure the completeness of the disclosure of financial statements for equity investments; [s]ufficient
expertise to ensure the proper disclosure of related-party transactions . . . [and s]ufficient expertise
to ensure the accuracy of the accounting and reporting of income taxes and related disclosures”).
218. Id. at *3.
219. Id. at *11, *20, *26, *49.
220. Id. at *47.
221. Id. at *48.
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faced a substantial likelihood of liability under Caremark, and denied
the defendant’s motion to dismiss.222
It may be tempting to claim that Hughes follows the trend of
Marchand and In re Clovis, but Hughes is significantly distinct.223 The
main distinction from Marchand and In re Clovis is that the
misconduct in Hughes did not involve any public health or public
interest issues.224 Unlike Clovis and Blue Bell, Kandi did not operate
a single-product business and was not in the food or pharmaceutical
industries. Kandi’s products were not of any issue in the case, which
further distinguishes it from the previous cases. Instead, the issue here
was that Kandi’s board failed to properly monitor the company’s
financial reporting.
It can be argued that the facts of Hughes are more similar to the
facts of Stone, in which the plaintiffs brought forth allegations based
on the company’s failure to comply with financial reporting
regulations. Similar to the company in Stone, Kandi’s actions were
regulated by the SEC. Unlike the FDA, the SEC’s mission is to
“protect investors by vigorously enforcing the federal securities laws
to hold wrongdoers accountable and deter future misconduct.”225
Therefore, the purpose of the SEC’s regulations is starkly different
from the public health concerns of the FDA, as the SEC is concerned
about financial misconduct, not physical harm. Thus, while it could be
argued that Hughes follows the trend of Marchand and Clovis, it is
more likely that the “particularly egregious” actions of the audit
committee allowed the Caremark claim to move past the pleading
stages.226
Although Hughes does not follow the public interest trend of
Marchand and Clovis, the case is significant because it shows how a
board may be held liable even if they have an audit committee in place.
While Kandi did have an audit committee in place, it only met when
222. Id. at *54; see generally Nicholas D. Mozal & David A. Seal, Three Is Not a Trend:
Another Caremark Claim Survives a Motion to Dismiss, but Does Not Reflect a Change in the Law,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 27, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/202
0/05/27/three-is-not-a-trend-another-caremark-claim-survives-a-motion-to-dismiss-but-does-notreflect-a-change-in-the-law/ (providing further background on the misconduct of the audit
committee).
223. Mozal & Seal, supra note 222.
224. Id.; Furey, supra note 96.
225. What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/about/what-we-do (last
visited April 11, 2021).
226. Mozal & Seal, supra note 222.
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federal securities law required it to meet, which was not often enough
considering the material weaknesses in the company’s internal
controls.227 The court also noted that the duration of the audit
committee meetings was too short, and there was “no possible way
that the Audit Committee could have fulfilled all of the responsibilities
it was given under the Audit Committee Charter during a fifty-minute
meeting.”228 Additionally, Kandi claimed that they had retained an
independent, outside auditor; however, this auditor’s sole client was
Kandi, which put into question whether the auditor was truly
independent.229 Thus the court claimed that the audit committee was
liable for Kandi’s “pervasive problems with its internal controls” due
to the committee meeting sporadically, not devoting adequate time to
its work, and “consciously turned a blind eye to their continuation.”230
While the actions of the audit committee in Hughes are egregious and
likely not analogous to a majority of audit committees, it is important
for boards to be reminded of the significance of meeting regularly and
effectively addressing irregularities to avoid liability.231
V. HOW TO NAVIGATE COMPLIANCE FOLLOWING MARCHAND
When navigating the duty to monitor, boards must consider not
only case law but also federal regulations and current societal issues.
The following part will consider these factors and address the
necessary steps that boards should take moving forward to avoid
liability. In Section V.A, I will consider how Marchand and
subsequent litigation has impacted directors’ assessment of their
monitoring systems. Further, in Section V.B, I will examine the
influence that federal guidance has on boards’ duty to monitor. Lastly,
in Section V.C, I will consider the significant impacts of COVID-19,
and how the pandemic will affect the duty to monitor.
A. Impacts of Case Law on Boards’ Next Steps
After Marchand, Clovis, and Hughes, companies are likely left
questioning their compliance programs and wondering what a proper
oversight system should consist of. Some corporate attorneys do not
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Hughes, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 162, at *48; Mozal & Seal, supra note 222.
Hughes, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 162, at *16.
Id. at *45; Mozal & Seal, supra note 222.
Hughes, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 162, at *41–42.
Mozal & Seal, supra note 222.
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view Marchand as a shift in Delaware law, but instead, see the
decision as a caution to directors to actively engage in proper
oversight.232 However, others fear that Marchand creates a significant
shift in Delaware law, which could cause corporations to face
increased costs and efforts to implement a proper oversight
program.233 By requiring a more stringent oversight system for
corporations in highly regulated industries, the corporation will have
to face the costs of both designing and implementing its compliance
program.234 However, it is imperative that courts impose the stricter
Marchand standard when deciding whether plaintiffs can bring forth
a Caremark claim to protect consumers’ health and safety. While the
costs of the compliance program may be high, these costs are minimal
compared to the financial and reputational harm that a company may
face, along with the negative health risks that its consumers may be
impacted by.235
One of the significant lessons of Marchand is that corporate
minutes and other forms of documentation should be created to reflect
the board’s oversight efforts.236 These documents should reflect the
company’s reporting protocols, compliance with regulations, and any
actions taken to overcome business risks.237 In Marchand, the
Delaware Supreme Court stated that when a plaintiff can establish a
board has failed to take any efforts to make sure it is properly informed
of compliance issues, then “that supports an inference that the board
has not made the good faith effort that Caremark requires.”238 For this
reason, boards should regularly review, on either a quarterly or semiannual basis, the effectiveness of their compliance efforts through
third-party audits.239 Additionally, corporations must guarantee that
any compliance program contains clear direction about maintaining
and transferring any compliance responsibilities in the case of
232. See David A. Katz & Laura McIntosh, Oversight and Compliance Reminder, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Aug. 1, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/08/01/ove
rsight-and-compliance-reminder/.
233. See Posner, supra note 4.
234. RICHARD W. BLACKBURN & JEFFREY J. BINDER, 3 SUCCESSFUL PARTNERING BETWEEN
INSIDE AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL § 47:8 (rev. ed. 2020).
235. See id.
236. Katz & McIntosh, supra note 232.
237. Id.
238. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 822 (Del. 2019).
239. Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. CRIM. DIV. (June
2020), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/page/file/937501/download; Katz & McIntosh,
supra note 232.
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employee turnover.240 For example, if a corporation’s vice president
of human resources becomes the new chief financial officer, the
corporation must take care to transfer any compliance responsibilities
and ensure that the oversight system maintains continuity and
consistency.241
To expand oversight efforts, boards can also utilize committees
to review and keep records of the board’s risk management.242 While
not required, audit committees and risk management committees
could ensure that proper documentation is kept by consistently
reviewing board minutes and materials.243 However, the audit
committee must have the proper expertise and devote adequate time
to monitoring, so that they do not suffer the same fate as the directors
in Hughes.244 While there is no strict rule regarding proper expertise,
courts will likely consider whether the committee has industry-related
knowledge or previous experience, either through education or career
choices, how long the committee members have been involved in the
industry, and how they have handled risk management issues in the
past.245 Additionally, any documentation that is kept by committees,
or the board itself, should be detailed and include specific language.246
While privileged information should not be disclosed, these

240. BLACKBURN & BINDER, supra note 234.
241. Id.
242. Katz & McIntosh, supra note 232.
243. Id.
244. See Hughes v. Hu, No. 2019-0112-JTL, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 162, at *2 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27,
2020) (stating that the Company “lacked[ s]ufficient expertise relating to technical knowledge of
US GAAP requirements and SEC disclosure regulations; [s]ufficient expertise to ensure the
completeness of the disclosure of financial statements for equity investments; [s]ufficient expertise
to ensure the proper disclosure of related-party transactions . . . [and s]ufficient expertise to ensure
the accuracy of the accounting and reporting of income taxes and related disclosures”).
245. See In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., No. 2017-0222-JRS, 2019 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 1293, at *5–8 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019) (discussing the defendants’ length of time on the
board, experience in the relevant industry, prior careers, and history serving on other boards); see
also Nicholas J. Price, The Best Practices for Board Education, DILIGENT INSIGHTS (June 27,
2018),
https://insights.diligent.com/board-education/the-best-practices-for-board-education
(discussing how board directors should seek out continuing education that will help them
understand how to “leverage the corporation’s potential, manage data and information, mitigate
risks and protect the corporation’s reputation”).
246. See Katz & McIntosh, supra note 232 (stating vague, generalized language is not sufficient
and lack of detail may be viewed as evidence that the board failed to make a good faith effort
towards oversight); Mozal & Seal, supra note 222 (discussing how the absence of detailed minutes
in Hughes led the Delaware Court of Chancery to deny the motion to dismiss).
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documents should not be drafted so vaguely or generalized as to doubt
the board’s compliance.247
B. Federal Guidance on the Duty to Monitor
Historically, the duty to monitor has been governed by the 1991
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which created a legal incentive for
corporations to develop and operate an effective compliance
system.248 Recently, federal law has been “trending strongly in the
direction of a robust corporate compliance obligation in many
disparate fields of regulation,” including antitrust, financial services,
and healthcare industries.249 Prior to Marchand, the Department of
Justice released a memorandum in April 2019 providing additional
guidance on how to navigate corporate compliance.250 This updated
guidance provides factors that prosecutors should consider when
determining whether to prosecute or penalize a corporation depending
on the effectiveness of the corporation’s compliance program at the
time of the offense.251 When considering a corporation’s oversight
system, prosecutors will consider whether the company has made sure
that the compliance program is understood by company employees
and whether the compliance program has been continuously improved
through periodic testing and reviews.252 The DOJ memorandum
247. See Katz & McIntosh, supra note 232 (discussing how documents should not contain
vague, generalized information).
248. McGreal, supra note 33, at 647. In 2004, the Sentencing Guidelines were updated to
address the role of directors with regard to corporate compliance. Id. at 669. The updated Guidelines
noted that a strong commitment from the board and senior management is critical for the
compliance program to succeed. Id. at 671. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines created a foundation
for federal corporate compliance and led the way for future federal involvement, perhaps
influencing the DOJ’s 2019 Memorandum. See id. at 677–79.
249. Donald C. Langevoort, Caremark and Compliance: A Twenty-Year Lookback, 90 TEMP.
L. REV. 727, 728 (2018).
250. John Nassikas et al., New DOJ Compliance Program Guide, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (June 10, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/06/10/new-doj-complianceprogram-guidance/; Katz & McIntosh, supra note 232; Evaluation of Corporate Compliance
Programs, supra note 239.
251. Nassikas et al., supra note 250; Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs, supra
note 239.
252. Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs, supra note 239 (stating that “prosecutors
may reward efforts to promote improvement and sustainability”). In considering audits, the
prosecutors will analyze how frequently the audits took place, whether they are internal or not, and
whether the relevant audit findings are regularly reported to the board. Id. Prosecutors assess
periodic testing by considering how the corporation tests and analyzes compliance data, and how
the results are reported and tracked. Id. Additionally prosecutors are concerned with how the
company updates its risk assessments and what steps it takes to determine the best policies and
practices for the particular business model. Id.
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suggests that prosecutors will further consider what types of issues
have been reported to the board, how the board has addressed them,
and whether documentation of board minutes can show that the board
has acted diligently in fulfilling their duty to monitor.253 Thus, the DOJ
memorandum compliments the Marchand decision by emphasizing
the importance of maintaining an adequate oversight and compliance
program.254
C. Increased Liability from COVID-19
The risk of shareholder derivative litigation is especially
heightened during the crisis of COVID-19.255 Attorneys and scholars
have already predicted an increase in Caremark claims as a result of
the massive business disruption caused by the unprecedented health
crisis.256 The COVID-19 pandemic creates a unique circumstance,
where companies are now being held to additional regulations that
require social distancing and increased health and safety measures.257
Similar to Marchand and Clovis, the failure to monitor compliance
with positive law,258 such as the COVID-19 regulations, makes it more
likely for plaintiffs to succeed in bringing a Caremark claim.259 While
companies are additionally facing increased financial litigation in light
of COVID-19, it will be more likely for a board to be held liable for
failure to monitor if the corporation’s actions create a public health
risk, as was seen in Marchand and Clovis.260 For example, if the
directors of a travel or restaurant company decide to continue normal
business operations despite social distancing regulations, its
consumers would be placed at an increased risk to COVID-19 and the
corporation could be found liable for failing to monitor critical
conditions.261 Additionally, boards may face liability for their failure
253. Id.
254. See id.
255. Scott Crofton et al., How Boards Can Protect Against Covid-19-Related Shareholder
Claims, CORP. SECRETARY (May 15, 2020), https://www.corporatesecretary.com/articles/shareho
lders/32102/how-boards-can-protect-against-covid-19-related-shareholder-claims.
256. William Savitt et al., Governance Litigation and the COVID-19 Pandemic, HARV. L. SCH.
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Apr. 19, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/04/19/governa
nce-litigation-and-the-covid-19-pandemic/.
257. Crofton et al., supra note 255.
258. See supra text accompanying note 200.
259. See Crofton et al., supra note 255.
260. See Savitt et al., supra note 256.
261. See Lisa Nagele-Piazza, Here’s What Employers Need to Know About COVID-19 Liability
Shields, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RES. MGMNT. (Sept. 4, 2020), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools
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to properly prepare for the pandemic, which could include claims that
the board failed to take steps to mitigate risks or take proper
precautionary measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19 among
employees or customers.262 While businesses are advocating for
legislation to protect themselves from COVID-19-related liability,
very few states have created such protections and there remains no
protection at the federal level.263 These few state protections are
extremely limited, and employers must still show that they acted in
good faith to comply with federal, state, and local guidance.264
Additionally, it is important to note that a board’s compliance
with federal and state regulations is not enough.265 When Blue Bell
argued that it had complied with certain FDA and state regulations,
the court in Marchand made sure to note that compliance with
regulations does not imply that the board implemented an adequate
monitoring system at the board-level.266 The risks of COVID-19 are
unique to each company’s line of business.267 As companies move
forward and contemplate reopening, it is vital for boards to
affirmatively investigate mission-critical compliance risks created by
COVID-19.268 Corporations should continue to take accurate and
detailed board minutes, form COVID-19 committees, and consider the
use of third-party advisors to supplement their compliance efforts.269
COVID-19 presents multiple red-flag issues that corporations must
address expeditiously to survive this pandemic and prevent any
shareholder derivative suits in the future.
/legal-and-compliance/employment-law/pages/what-employers-need-to-know-about-covid-19liability-shields.aspx.
262. Virginia Milstead, Shareholder Derivative Suits Likely to Extend to COVID-19, Racial
Equality, SKADDEN (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2020/09/qu
arterly-insights/shareholder-derivative-suits.
263. Nagele-Piazza, supra note 261. In Georgia, recent legislation has created a “rebuttable
presumption that the plaintiff assumed the risk of exposure, transmission, infection or potential
exposure to COVID-19, unless the plaintiff is asserting certain claims involving gross negligence,
willful misconduct[,] or reckless behavior.” Id. Additionally, New Jersey’s law only protects health
care providers from COVID-19-related liability in order to remove any impediments to providing
medical treatment. Id.
264. See id.
265. Crofton et al., supra note 255.
266. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 823 (Del. 2019); Crofton et al., supra note 255.
267. Nicholas A. Gravante et al., Caremark Precedent Should Inform Boards’ COVID-19
Duties, LEXOLOGY (June 4, 2020), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=6ffca5907598-4450-9f43-85a4d0736872.
268. Id.
269. Crofton et al., supra note 255.
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The main goal of a compliance program is to create a system in
which the board will receive all necessary information regarding
significant business risks, thereby allowing the board to take
appropriate action.270 Risk management is a significant issue that
corporations must learn how to navigate, especially in times where one
small mistake can cause catastrophic harm not only to the company’s
business, but also to the public’s health. The Supreme Court of
Delaware has moved in the right direction with Marchand, and it is
crucial for companies to strengthen their fiduciary duty to monitor,
especially during these times.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since the decision of Graham in 1963, Delaware courts have
come quite a long way in interpreting the duty to monitor. Instead of
passively responding to red flags, directors must now take initiative to
actively address and resolve critical risks that could harm the
corporation.271 While all companies must uphold their fiduciary duty
to monitor, highly regulated industries are under heightened scrutiny.
Corporations in the food, beverage, and pharmaceutical industries are
at a higher risk of facing shareholder derivative suits based on their
obligation to comply with federal and state regulations and protect
public health.272 Consumers rely on these companies to provide safe
and healthy products, and if the board fails to properly monitor
operations, it could cause their consumers to face significant health
risks and their company to suffer a loss of business. Hughes also
showed us that establishing an audit committee is not enough if that
committee does not have the requisite knowledge and demonstrate
reasonable efforts to manage risks.273 Marchand has arguably created
a new era for duty to monitor cases, one in which plaintiffs are more
likely to succeed in holding directors liable for failure to monitor.
While commentators fear that Marchand will create risk-averse
businesses, the heightened liability is necessary to hold boards
accountable for their actions.274
270. Katz & McIntosh, supra note 232.
271. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 820–21.
272. See id.; In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., No. 2017-0222-JRS, 2019 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 1293, at *2–4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019).
273. Hughes v. Hu, No. 2019-0112-JTL, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 162, at *40–41 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 27, 2020).
274. See Daniels, supra note 20.
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Moving forward, it is crucial for boards to establish risk
management policies at the board-level. Especially during the current
COVID-19 pandemic, it is now more important than ever for boards
to stay vigilant and document their efforts in corporate books and
records.275 The recent guidance from Marchand will hopefully
influence boards to take action and prevent future risks that could cost
them the support of their shareholders and consumers. Overall, the
Marchand decision has led the duty to monitor in the right direction
and future Caremark claims involving public interest issues are likely
to follow the same trend.

275. See Gravante et al., supra note 267.
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